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REAL PROPERTY-STATE HAS TITLE TO

FORESHORES OF GEORGIA'S NAVIGABLE WATERS
In State v. Ashmore,' the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the State
has fee simple title to the foreshore of all navigable tidewaters.
On December 6, 1973, the State of Georgia filed suit in the Superior
Court of Glynn County disputing the defendants' right to develop for condominiums a beach and dune area on St. Simons Island, Glynn County,
Georgia. The State asserted that the property belonged to the State and
that the property had been dedicated to public use. The superior court,
however, granted the motions of the Ashmores to dismiss the State's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
for summary judgment against the State, and denied the State's motion
for summary judgment.
The property in dispute had been formed by the process of accretion in
the years since 1911. The general public had used the foreshore where it
has been located from time to time over the years for fishing, bathing and
recreation. Prior to this suit, no efforts to prevent public use of the foreshore had been made. In answering the question of who owns the foreshore
along the beach at St. Simons Island, the court determined who owns the
rest of the beaches in Georgia.2
As early as the Stuart monarchs, the theory of prima facie Crown ownership of tidelands was present in England.3 After the American Revolution,
4
the states of the United States succeeded to the rights of the Crown.
Although a minority of states extended private ownership down to the low
water mark, Georgia, along with the majority of states, held that ownership
to the foreshore up to the high water mark was in the State. A majority
of courts have held that title of the riparian owner, "who claims merely
by grant of the upland extends no further than the high water mark, unless
the legislature has made some provision for extending it further."' It was
the 6ontention of the Ashmores that the Georgia General Assembly made
such a provision in 1902. Georgia Laws 1902, p. 1081 (hereinafter referred
1.
2.
3.

State v. Ashmore, Nos. 30176, 30177 (Ga., Feb. 24, 1976).
See United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132, 1134, 1140 (S.D.Ga. 1973).
See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38L.Ed. 331 (1894); 1 FARNHAM, WATER
AND WATER RIGHTs 209-10 (1904); Parsons, Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, 22
C6 dM. L. Rsv. 706, 707-08 (1922).
4. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and His Britannic Majesty, 8
Stat. 80 (1783); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894); Martin v.
Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 10 L.Ed. 997 (1842); Johnson v. State, 114 Ga. 790, 40 S.E. 807 (1902).
5. State v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228 A.2d 587, 596-600 (Del. 1967); Johnson v. State, 114
Ga. 790, 40 S.E. 807 (1902); 1 FARNHAM, supra note 3 at 209. See, e.g., Mobile Transp. Co. v.
Mobile, 187 U.S. 479, 23 S.Ct. 170, 47 L.Ed. 266 (1903).
6. 1 FARNHAM, supra note 3 at 209. See State v. Pennsylvania R.R., 228 A. 2d 587, at 597
(Del. 1967).
7. The Act provides:
SECTION 1. That from and after the passage of this Act the title to the beds of all
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to as the 1902 Act) was passed immediately after Johnson v. State' held
that criminal action could not be taken against someone who took oysters
from a tidewater area adjoining private property, as private ownership of
navigable tidewaters did not extend to the low water mark. In light of the
Johnson holding and the concern over the failing oyster industry, it appears that the 1902 Act was passed in an attempt to revitalize the Georgia
oyster industry.' Although poorly drafted, the Statute explicitly grants the
"exclusive right to the oysters and clams" but clearly omits any terms of
conveyance in reference to navigable tidewaters.' 0 Instead, the 1902 Act
generally extends "boundaries and rights . . . to [the] low water mark.""
The ambiguity of the 1902 Act has already been examined with the conclusion that "[t]he common law tradition clearly indicates that the 1902 Act
should be strictly construed in favor of the public, not against the public. .. "12
tide-waters in this State, where the tide regularly ebbs and flows, and which are
not navigable under Section 2 of this Act, shall vest in the present owner of the
adjacent land for all purposes, including among others, the exclusive right to oysters, clams and other shell fish therein or thereon. If the water is the dividing line,
each owner's boundary shall extend to the main thread or channel of the water. If
the main thread, or center, or channel of the water changes gradually, the line
follows the same, according to the change. If for any cause it takes a new channel,
the original line, if capable of identification, remains the boundary. Gradual accretions of land on either side accrue to the owner.
SECTION 2. Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That a navigable tidewater, in contemplation of this Act, is any tide-water, the sea, or any inlet thereof,
or other bed of water where the tide regularly ebbs and flows, which is in fact used
for the purposes of navigation, or is capable of bearing upon its bosom at mean low
tide boats loaded with freight in the regular course of trade. The mere rafting of
timber thereon, or the passage of small boats thereover, whether for the transportation of persons or freight, shall not be deemed navigation within the meaning of
this Act, and does not make tide-water navigable.
SECTION 3. Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That for all purposes,
including among others the exclusive right to the oysters and clams (but not to
include other fish) therein or thereon being, the boundaries and rights of owners of
land adjacent to or covered in whole or in part by navigable tide-waters, as defined
in section 2 of this Act, shall extend to low water mark in the bed if the water,
provided, however, that nothing in this Act contained shall be so construed as to
authorize such an exclusive appropriation of any tidewater, navigable or unnavigable, by any person whomsoever, as to prevent the free use of the same by others for
purposes of passage and for the transportation of such freights as may be capable
of being carried thereover.
Ga. Laws 1902, p. 108, codified at GA. CODE ANN. §85-1307 et seq. (Rev. 1970).
8. 114 Ga. 790, 40 S.E. 807 (1902).
9. Jones v. Oemler, 110 Ga. 202, 35 S.E. 375 (1900), describes some of the problems of
the oyster industry and discusses several of the numerous laws enacted to assist commercial
oyster production. See also Smith and Sammons, Public Rights in Georgia's Tidelands, 9 GA.
L. REv. 79, 101, 103 n. 149 (1974).
10. The Statute defines the sea as a navigable tidewater. Ga. Laws 1902, p. 108, codified
at GA. CODE ANN. §85-1307 (Rev. 1970).
11. Ga. Laws 1902, p. 108, codified at GA. CODE ANN. §85-1309 (Rev. 1970).
12. Smith and Sammons, supra note 9 at 105.
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It has been argued that even if the Georgia 1902 Act had been a clear
attempt to convey title of the foreshore to private adjoining owners, such
a conveyance would have been unconstitutional.' 3 The Georgia Constitution prohibits legislative donations and gratuities.'4 Odd Fellows v. City of
Thomasville'5 held that the constitutional prohibition applied to grants of
land as well as monetary donations. The only exception to this constitutional prohibition is when an alleged donation or gratuity is one from which
great public benefits are expected.' 6 In Illinois CentralR.R. v. Illinois," the
United States Supreme Court supported a similar prohibition and exception upon the historical Public Trust Doctrine that a state holds public
lands as trustee for its citizens:
A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never
been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant
of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to
revocation. The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in
which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils
under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of
private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can
be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains,
than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government
and the preservation of the peace.S
Several states, including New York,'" New Jersey,2' and Hawaii, 2 ' have
adopted this two-prong test and allow private ownership of the foreshore
to extend down to the low water mark only if it is for a public benefit and
an "improvement of the navigation and use of the waters," or "without
impairment of the public interest in what remains."
In 1945, the General Assembly attempted to ratify and confirm the 1902
22
Act by adding a ratification provision in the 1945 Georgia Constitution.
Brief for Appellants at 16, State v. Ashmore, Nos. 30176, 30177 (Ga., Feb. 24, 1976).
1 (1877); GA. CONST., art. VII, §1, 2, codified at GA. CODE
ANN. §2-5402 (Rev. 1974), provided in 1902 as follows: "1. The General Assembly shall not
by vote, resolution, or order, grant any donation, or gratuity, in favor of any person, corporation, or association."
15. 226 Ga. 4, 8, 172 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1970).
16. Georgia v. Trustees of Cincinnati S. R.R., 248 U.S. 26, 30, 39 S.Ct. 14, 15, 63 L.Ed.
104, 107 (1918). Other cases which have held that grants and legislation in aid of public
purposes do not run afoul of the constitutional provision include: Sigman v. Brunswick Port
Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958); State Highway Dept. v. Bass, 197 Ga. 356, 29
S.E.2d 161 (1944); Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hosp., Inc., 189 Ga. 126, 5 S.E.2d 356 (1939).
17. 146 U.S. 387, 135 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892).
18. Id. at 453, 13 S.Ct. at 118, 36 L.Ed. at 1043.
19. Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc. 2d 524, -, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 774 (1972).
, 292 A.2d 545, 579
20. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, (1972).
21. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Hawaii 176, -, 517 P.2d 57, 63 (1973).
22. GA. CONST. art. I, §6, 1, codified at GA. CODE ANN. §2-601 (Rev. 1945) provides:
13.
14.

GA. CONST., art. VII, §16,
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However, the Georgia courts have consistently held that "[t]he time with
reference to which the constitutionality of an act of the general assembly
is to be determined is the date of its passage, and, if it is unconstitutional,
then it is forever void."" In Support of the 1945 ratification, Hammond v.
Clark' and Calhoun v. KeUogg" have been cited for the proposition that
a subsequent constitutional amendment, expressly ratifying and confirming a prior act, may retroactively validate that legislation where it may
have been of questionable stature."
In Ashmore, the court cited Hammond and summarily dismissed the
State's argument that the 1902 Act was unconstitutional. 2 Instead, the
court held that constitutional ratification immunized the 1902 Act from a
later successful constitutional attack.
The Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion in Ashmore, that the State has
fee simple title to the foreshore in all navigable tidewaters, rests upon two
findings. First, the court found that the 1945 provision, "the Act of the
General Assembly approved December 16, 1902, which extends the title of
ownership of lands abutting on tidal water to low water mark is hereby
ratified and confirmed," was inserted to identify which Act approved on
December 16, 1902, was being ratified. The court held that this language
is merely for the purposes of identification and is not to be construed as
mandatory or directory. Second, the court reviewed the record of the 194344 Constitutional Commission and found that the Commission's intention
was not to extend the titles of landowners, adjacent to tidewaters, to the
low water mark. The Commission's intention was to protect and bolster the
oyster industry in Georgia by giving cultivators in the oyster industry
property rights in the oyster beds that they had planted. 2 The court reasoned that this conclusion comports with the general principle that a public grant is construed strictly against the grantee and nothing is taken by
implication.21
The court, in finding that the State had title in all navigable tidewaters,
was careful to delineate between navigable and non-navigable tidewaters.
Although it declined to define non-navigable tidewaters, it did caution
Tidewater titles confirmed. The Act of the General Assembly approved December
16, 1902, which extends the title of ownership of lands abutting on tidal water to
low water mark is hereby ratified and confirmed.
23. Jones v. McCaskill, 112 Ga. 453, 456, 37 S.E. 724, 725 (1900). See also Jamison v. City
of Atlanta, 225 Ga. 51, 165 S.E.2d 647 (1969); Sentell, Unconstitutionalityin Georgia:Problems of Nothing, 8 GA. L. REv. 101 (1973).
24. 136 Ga. 313, 71 S.E. 479 (1911).
25. 41 Ga. 232 (1870).
26. Brief for the Appellees at 17, State v. Ashmore, Nos. 30176, 30177 (Ga., Feb. 24, 1976).
27. Nos. 30176, 30177 at 5 (Ga., Feb. 24, 1976).
28. Id. at 7-13, quoting from Proceedings of 1943-44 Constitutional Commission.
29. Id. at 18. See McLeod v. Savannah, A.&.G. R.R., 25 Ga. 445, 457 (1858); McLeod v.
Burroughs, 9 Ga. 213, 221 (1851).
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that its holding applied solely to navigable tidewaters. 3
A result in Ashmore other than the holding that the State had title in
all navigable tidewaters would have marked a break from the long tradition of protecting the public interest in the foreshore. However, the majority opinion is extremely disappointing in that it averts the real issue of
whether the 1902 Act was constitutional by summarily citing Hammond
for the proposition that "the 1910 General Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment, later ratified by the voters, that ratified, validated, and
confirmed the series of statutes that had been declared unconstitutional
by this court." 3'
Exclusively on the holding of Hammond, the court held that
the constitutional ratification in 1945 of the 1902 Act, which had been in
effect since its enactment and had not been held to be unconstitutional,
was effective. In short, the 1945 constitutional ratification
immunized the
32
1902 Act from a later successful constitutional attack.
In dismissing the constitutional question, the court ignored its own recent holding in Seago v. Richmond County.3 3 There, the court adopted a
rule, as stated in Corpus Juris Secundum, that
[tihe matter printed on the ballot must be sufficient to identify the
amendment referred to and to show its character and purpose, and the
question as framed on the ballot must not be misleading or inconsistent
with other provisions of the resolution.3 '
In Seago, the court held that an amendment to the Constitution of 1945
was void because neither the resolution nor
the words printed on the ballots correctly state the real purpose of the
proposed amendment and they are .. .therefore misleading; this being
true, the conclusion is inevitable that the voters were not. . . intelligently
informed concerning the nature, character, scope or purpose of the proposed amendment.35
Similarly, in Ashmore the court reviewed the 1945 constitutional provision: "The Act of the General Assembly approved December 16, 1902,
which extends the title of ownership of lands abutting tidal on water to
low water mark is hereby ratified and confirmed. 3' ' 6 In holding that the
provision, "The Act of the General Assembly approved December 16,
30. Nos. 30176, 30177 at 5.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33, 218 Ga. 151, 126 S.E.2d 657 (1962).
34. Id.at 155, 126 S.E.2d at 661, quoting from 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §9(3) at 5657 (emphasis added).
35. 218 Ga. at 156, 126 S.E.2d at 660.
36. GA. CONST. art. I, §6, 1, codified at GA. CODE ANN. §2-601 (Rev. 1973).

1234

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

1902, which extends title . . ." is not self executing and is neither mandatory nor directory but rather, is merely an identifying phrase which
"contradicts the caption of the very 1902 Act it is ratifying," the court
inexcusably ignores its own holding in Seago. Not only does the court in
Ashmore conclude that the 1945 provision "contradicts the caption of the
very 1902 Act it is ratifying," it also noted that "this identifying phrase
contradicts the body of the 1902 Act it is ratifying."37 The veracity of the
court's perception is indisputable. However, the court should have concluded that the voters were not intelligently informed concerning the nature, character, and scope of the proposed constitutional provision and
that, therefore, the 1902 Act was not ratified and confirmed by the 1945
Constitution. Admittedly, this conclusion would have reopened the question of who has rights to the oysterbeds; however, in light of Seago, such a
conclusion is inescapable under the rationale of Ashmore.
In addition to the absence .of ratification and confirmation, it is questionable whether the 1902 Act could withstand judicial scrutiny under the
rationale of Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois," for the 1902 Act did not
encourage an "improvement of the navigation and use of the water," nor
was it a disposal "without impairment of the public interest in what remains.""9 Had the Georgia Supreme Court taken the initiative it could
have protected the public interest in the future by adopting the rationale
of Illinois CentralR.R. As it has frequently been noted, self-interested and
powerful minorities often have an undue influence on the public resource
decisions of legislative and administrative bodies and cause these bodies
to ignore broad based public interests. 40 Instead of being given a strong
sense of security that only for the public benefit would the Georgia beaches
be granted to exclusively private use, the people of Georgia are left with a
fleeting sense of relief that this time the legislators did not intend to give
away the beaches.
In distinguishing between navigable and non-navigable tidewaters, the
court apparently leaves open several questions. First, the issue now left to
be decided is whether marshlands are "navigable" or "non-navigable"
tidewaters. The 1902 Act defines navigable tidewaters as
any tidewater, the sea, or any inlet thereof, or other bed of water where
the tide regularly ebbs and flows, which is in fact used for the purposes of
navigation, or is capable of bearing upon its bosom, at mean low tide,
boats loaded with freight in the regular course of trade. The mere rafting
of timber thereon, or the passage of small boats thereover, whether for the
transportation of persons or freight, shall not be deemed navigation within
37. Nos. 30176, 30177 at 6.
38. 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892).
39. Id. at 453, 13 S.Ct. at 118, 36 L.Ed. at 1043.
40. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 560 (1969).
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the meaning of this and the preceding section, and shall not make tidewater navigable.'
It is unclear whether the word "which," in introducing the qualification
that in order to be navigable the body of water must be "used for the
purposes of navigation, or is capable of bearing upon its bosom, at mean
low tide, boats loaded with freight in the regular course of trade," applies
solely to the phrase "other bed of water where the tide regularly ebbs and
flows" or is all-inclusive in that it also applies to any "tidewater, the sea,
or any inlet thereof." The distinction is crucial in that if "which" is allinclusive and applies to "inlets" as well as "other bed[s] of water," then
in a future suit the marshland water would probably be held to be "nonnavigable" as it is not "in fact used for the purposes of navigation or is
capable of bearing upon its bosom, at mean low tide, boats loaded with
freight in the regular course of trade." On the other hand, if the word
"which" applies solely to the phrase "other bed of water," then the water
off the marshland would probably be considered navigable as an inlet of
the sea. Therefore, under the rationale of Ashmore, title to the foreshore
42
would be in the State.
Another question which the court itself raises and declines to answer is
that even if the waters of the marshlands are considered non-navigable,
does the "title," which is vested in the abutting landowners, apply to
oyster bed, bottoms, or land? Section 1 of the 1902 Act provides that
"[tihe title to the beds of all tidewaters, where the tide regularly ebbs and
flows, and which are not navigable under the next succeeding section, shall
vest in the present owner of the adjacent land for all purposes . . . . ,,41
As
the court points out, it is unclear whether the phrase "title to the beds"
relates to the oyster beds, bottoms, or land." Again, the distinction is
crucial in that if the only title which is vested in abutting landowners is
the title to the oyster beds, then title to the foreshore is impliedly left in
the State. In contrast, if the phrase "title to the beds" applies to the land,
then under the rationale of Ashmore, title in the marshlands between the
low and high water mark is vested in adjacent landowners.
In the event the phrase "title to the beds" applies to the land, thereby
vesting title between the low and high water mark in adjacent landowners,
Justice Gunter's well-reasoned dissent will become increasingly persuasive. He notes that section 3 of the 1902 Act provides that
nothing in this Act contained shall be so construed as to authorize such
an exclusive appropriation of any tidewater, navigable or unnavigable, by
any person whomsoever, as to prevent the free use of the same by others
41. GA. CODE ANN. §85-1308 (Rev. 1970).
42. See State v. Ashmore, Nos. 30176, 30177 at 6 (Ga., Feb. 24, 1976).
43. GA. CODE ANN. §85-1307 (Rev. 1970).
44. Id.
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for purposes of passage and for the transportation of such freights as may
be capable of being carried thereover.'5
It is Justice Gunter's view that in light of section 3 any extension of boundaries from the high-water mark to the low-water mark by the General
Assembly was specifically subject to an easement in favor of the general
public." In addition he does not agree "with the narrow, limited interpretation of 'fishing, passage, and transportation' urged upon the court in this
case by the appellees."'' Therefore, on the basis of his dissent, even if at
some future time it is held that private ownership extends to the low water
mark in the marshlands, easement rights may still remain in the public.
Although a landmark case, the Ashmore decision is disappointing in two
respects. First, the court's distinction between navigable and nonnavigable tidewaters leaves the question of who owns the Georgia marshlands open to future judicial determination. Second, and more
important, the court's failure to adopt the rationale of Illinois CentralR.R.
and thereby limit the legislature's power to gratuitously convey portions
of the foreshore to those situations where it benefits the public and is an
"improvement of the navigation and use of the waters," or "without impairment of the public interest in what remains," leaves no guidelines that
would aid in determining the validity of any future grants of foreshore.
DONNA BERGH
45.
46.
47.

Ga. Laws, 1902. p. 108, codified at GA. CODE ANN. §85-1309 (Rev. 1970).
Nos. 30176, 30177 at 2 (Gunter, J., dissenting).
Id.

